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This article considers how much outside influence matters to the constitutional analysis of state politics. It
defends the political community principle applied in Bluman v. Federal Election Comm’n as an exception
to the otherwise universal speaker-neutrality rule of Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n. It draws
parallels between efforts to police national and state boundaries in politics, and the competing rights claims
of outsiders to cross those boundaries and participate fully in domestic politics. The article suggests that the
structural constitutional principle of political community supports certain state regulations of outside influ-
ence across a range of political activities. Part I reviews the structural and historical basis for the constitu-
tional concern about outside influence. Part II considers the gnarled doctrinal roots of Bluman, and how they
might help support state, as well as national, safeguards against outside influence. Part III proposes an impor-
tant state interest in regulating, but not excluding, outside influence in state and local politics, and suggests
some applications of the principle to outside influence in several spheres of political activity.
INTRODUCTION
By what rights do outsiders influence stateor local politics? By ‘‘outsiders’’ I mean an
array of persons other than the citizens of the com-
munity, including non-resident individuals, corpora-
tions, and various other organizations that channel
the influence of those outsiders into a state or
local political process. By ‘‘state or local politics’’
I mean all politics, including elections held by states
for federal officials. The question recurs in voting,
petitioning, campaign finance regulation, and lob-
bying, as well as other areas related to political
activity such as corporate governance.
Relatively recent developments have accelerated
the nationalization of American politics. Nationaliz-
ing forces, including the strengthening of non-party
national political interest groups by federal legisla-
tion and judicial decisions, and national efforts to
counter those groups’ interests, pose the question of
outside influence more urgently now. Meanwhile,
the concern underlying the question has deep roots
in the constitutional conception of republicanism
and is complicated by an often unseemly history of
state efforts to block the entry of civil rights and
other valuable national movements into state politics.
As a political matter, outsiders bear a potent
connotation captured in the Reconstruction-Era
epithet ‘‘carpetbagger.’’1 Candidates with back-
grounds from outside their hoped-for constituency
face questions like that posed to New York SenateAnthony Johnstone is an assistant professor at the University of
Montana School of Law, Missoula, MT. The author thanks par-
ticipants at the Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy confer-
ence ‘‘Under the Influence: Interest Groups, Lobbying, and
Campaign Finance’’ for helpful comments, Samir Aarab for
editorial assistance, and his family for their support. The author
served as counsel for the State of Montana in American Tradi-
tion Partnership v. Bullock, for 26 States as amici curiae in Citi-
zens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, and for 13 States as
amici curiae in Nader v. Brewer.
1See Ted Tunnel, Creating ‘‘The Propaganda of History’’:
Southern Editors and the Origins of ‘‘Carpetbagger and Scala-
wag’’, 72 Journal of Southern History 789, 790-94 (Nov. 2006)
(explaining origins of ‘‘carpetbagger’’ in Southern newspapers
during the state constitutional conventions held under the
Reconstruction Acts).
ELECTION LAW JOURNAL
Volume 13, Number 1, 2014
# Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.
DOI: 10.1089/elj.2013.0210
117
candidate Robert F. Kennedy: ‘‘Why should you
represent a state where you cannot even vote?’’2
The suspicion of outside influence extends to cam-
paign finance. Two recent Colorado state legislative
recall elections attracted hundreds of thousands of
dollars of ‘‘outside money’’ from out-of-state inter-
est groups. One side accused pro-recall groups as
being ‘‘too extreme for Colorado,’’ while the other
side responded that former New York Mayor Mi-
chael ‘‘Bloomberg[’s] money has been pushing
this entire issue from the start.’’3 In the 2013 Vir-
ginia gubernatorial election, super political action
committees (PACs) funded by Bloomberg and a
San Francisco hedge-fund manager spent more
than $2 million each, in one case running an ad
that itself played on outside money concerns.4 Out-
side influence has had similar impacts in petition
circulation,5 ballot issue campaigns,6 and lobbying
and other legislative advocacy.7 While the original
carpetbaggers and more recent outsiders like the
National Association for the Advancement of Col-
ored People (NAACP) took the side of basic civil
rights,8 the current forces of outside influence
align on both sides of major political controversies.
As a constitutional matter, however, the conven-
tional account of outside influence holds its ‘‘out-
sider’’ status to be irrelevant for all, or nearly all,
political processes short of qualifications for public
office and voting. Even in voting, courts view suspi-
ciously all but the most basic distinctions between
insiders and outsiders arising from residence. Yet
in other political activities, outsiders play impor-
tant and sometimes leading roles in state and local
politics. Just beyond the insiders-only ballot box,
outsiders drop in to get out the vote and police the
polling place. A little further away, they stand
with clipboards gathering signatures to qualify a
ballot issue or candidate petition. After the votes
are counted, outsiders may claim a decisive influ-
ence on the outcome through campaign contribu-
tions and expenditures that may exceed the total
amount raised by candidates or spent by insiders.
When the elected official arrives on the job, outsid-
ers will lobby, draft legislation for, and contribute to
(or threaten to spend against) the official to exert
continuing influence over the political process.
In all of this, the law draws little or no distinction
between the outsider and insider participants in the
process. Of course, a successful elected official
must be concerned, or be seen to be concerned,
with insiders more than outsiders. Only insiders
vote. But the elected official also must look beyond
the ballot box to voter mobilization, ballot access,
ballot issues, campaign contributions and indepen-
dent expenditures, and successful negotiation of
the legislative process. At each stage of the political
process outsiders can have as much or more influ-
ence than the insiders the elected official technically
represents. This gives ‘‘outside influence’’ a sali-
ence in political campaigns that is noticeably absent
from election law and constitutional doctrine.
The lack of a legal account for outside influ-
ence revealed itself starkly in Citizens United v.
2Adam Nagorney, In a Kennedy’s Legacy, Lessons and Pitfalls
For Hillary Clinton; Carpetbagger Issue Has Echoes of ‘64,
But Differences Could Prove Crucial, N.Y. Times (Sept. 10,
2000); see also Sean Sullivan, Liz Cheney’s Biggest Challenge:
The Carpetbagger Label, Wash. Post.: The Fix ( July 17,
2013); James Nani, Eldridge Declares Candidacy, Gibson’s
Campaign Attacks, The Fray (Sept. 23, 2013), available at
< http://blogs.hudsonvalley.com/fray/2013/09/23/eldridge-
declares-candidacy-gibsons-campaign-attacks/ > (‘‘Eldridge’s
deep pockets have already been a mode of attack for the con-
gressional Republican committee, who have attacked him as a
rich, elite carpetbagger.’’).
3Nancy Watzman, Out of State Money Pouring into Colorado
Gun Recall Races, Sunlight Foundation Blog (Sept. 4, 2013),
available at < http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/09/04/
colorado-guns/ > .
4Peter Overby, Outside Money Plays Big Role in Va. Race for
Governor, Nat’l Public Radio (Nov. 8, 2013) (quoting ad
from NextGen Climate Action arguing ‘‘an attorney general is
paid by the taxpayers to stick up for us, not an out-of-state
energy company that gave him a bunch of money. Ken Cucci-
nelli cares more about campaign contributions than what’s
right or wrong.’’).
5See Editorial, Carpetbaggers Wanted, St. Louis Post-
Dispatch (Apr. 14, 2008) (‘‘A guy from California e-mails a
New York-based conservative website trying to recruit a couple
dozen more carpetbaggers to join his false flag operation.. If
one of Mr. Connerly’s carpetbaggers asks you to sign a petition
‘‘ensuring civil rights,’’ just say no and wish him a nice trip back
to wherever he came from.’’).
6See Jesse McKinley and Kirk Johnson,Mormons Tipped Scale
in Ban on Gay Marriage, N.Y. Times A1 (Nov. 14, 2008) (Pro-
tect Marriage, proponents of anti-same-sex marriage issue Cal-
ifornia’s Proposition 8, estimated ‘‘as much as half of the nearly
$40 million raised on behalf of the measure was contributed by
Mormons’’ in an effort led out of Utah).
7See Ed Pilkington and Suzanne Goldenberg, ALEC Facing
Funding Crisis From Donor Exodus in Wake of Trayvon Martin
Row, Guardian (Dec. 3, 2013) (describing the American
Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a legislative advocacy
group including nearly 2000 state legislators and funded by
more than 200 national corporations).
8See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 451
(1958) (considering Alabama’s efforts to exclude under its for-
eign corporation statute the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), ‘‘a nonprofit mem-
bership corporation organized under the laws of New York,’’
fostering its purposes ‘‘on a nationwide basis.’’).
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Federal Election Commission. One of the broadest
implications of Citizens United, consistent with
the general absence of insider-outsider lines in
most political activity, is that outside influence
does not matter. At least, it does not matter enough
to justify specific restrictions on outsiders. ‘‘[T]he
First Amendment generally prohibits the suppres-
sion of political speech based on the speaker’s iden-
tity,’’9 the Supreme Court held. There is a little more
to the Court’s most recent consideration of outsiders
than that, but not much. In a short section, the Court
explained it ‘‘need not reach the question whether
the Government has a compelling interest in prevent-
ing foreign individuals or associations from influenc-
ing our Nation’s political process,’’ because the law at
issue was not so limited.10 The dissent briefly took
issue with the Court’s distinction of foreigners as
‘‘outside’’ speech, and hinted at a broader principle
of ‘‘outsiders’’ by noting ‘‘even domestic corporations
may be ‘foreign’-controlled in the sense that they are
incorporated in another jurisdiction and primarily
owned and operated by out-of-state residents.’’11 Nei-
ther opinion offered any cases to support a distinction
as to foreigners or other outsiders.
Then came Benjamin Bluman, a five-year New
York resident and taxpaying lawyer who not only
could not vote, but could not spend even a dollar
printing and distributing flyers supporting candi-
dates in the state where he lives because he is an
outsider, a Canadian.12 He and Asenath Steiman,
an Israeli similarly interested in engaging her fel-
low New Yorkers, challenged the ban on foreign
nationals’ financial influence on elections that
the Court did not consider in Citizens United. Sud-
denly, outsider status mattered. A three-judge
court upheld the law based on what it called a
‘‘straightforward principle’’ about outside influ-
ence: ‘‘[i]t is fundamental to the definition of
our national political community that foreign cit-
izens do not have a constitutional right to partici-
pate in, and thus may be excluded from, activities
of democratic self-government.’’13 Forced to con-
front the issue the Supreme Court avoided, Judge
Kavanaugh wrote for the court a detailed opin-
ion on the constitutionality of barriers to foreign
participation in the political process, adopting
in part the reasoning of the Citizens United dis-
sent. Forced to confront the Bluman case on direct
appeal,14 the Supreme Court again avoided the
outside influence issue by affirming in a one-
sentence order.15
Under the Bluman principle, absent other consti-
tutional limitations, the concern with outside influ-
ence should matter to subnational communities too.
Nearly all participation in ‘‘activities of democratic
self-government’’ takes place at the state and local
level. It is at these levels that the traditional concern
about outside influence is most deeply rooted. Yet
two years after Citizens United the Court decided
American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock, which
summarily held there is no meaningful distinction
between Citizens United and a ‘‘foreign-controlled’’
(out-of-state) corporation’s challenge to a state cor-
porate campaign expenditure restriction.16 This sug-
gests that outside influence cannot matter as much
for states as it does for the nation. While no foreign
actors have the right to participate in any national
political process, according to the logic of current
doctrine all national actors would appear to have
the right to participate in all state political processes
beyond voting itself. The constitutional logic runs
counter to political experience, but even so the dis-
tinction may be a matter of degree, not of kind.
Assuming, as the Court in Citizens United suggests,
the answer to whether outsiders may participate is
9Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876,
905 (2010). The Court’s rationale:
Speech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker
are all too often simply a means to control con-
tent.Quite apart from the purpose or effect of regulating
content, moreover, the Government may commit a con-
stitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain pre-
ferred speakers. By taking the right to speak from
some and giving it to others, the Government deprives
the disadvantaged person or class of the right to use
speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and respect
for the speaker’s voice. The Government may not by
these means deprive the public of the right and privilege
to determine for itself what speech and speakers are wor-
thy of consideration. The First Amendment protects
speech and speaker, and the ideas that flow from
each.. We find no basis for the proposition that, in
the context of political speech, the Government may
impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers.
Id. at 899.
10Id. at 911.
11Id. at 971 n. 70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
12Bluman v. Federal Election Comm’n, 800 F.Supp.2d 281
(D.D.C. 2011) (three-judge court).
13Id. at 288.
14See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) x
403(a)(3), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, 113–14.
15Bluman v. Federal Election Comm’n, 132 S.Ct. 1087 (2012).
16American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock, 132 S.Ct. 2490
(2012).
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yes, there remains a question of how outsiders par-
ticipate. By taking categorical speech restrictions
off the table, while opening new channels for
increased and increasingly complex intervention
by outsiders in domestic politics, Citizens United
encourages states to regulate outside influence in
campaign finance and beyond. Properly understood,
it also allows states do so through less restrictive
means than prohibitions on speech or related polit-
ical activity.
This article considers how much outside influence
matters to the constitutional analysis of state politics.
It defends the principle applied in Bluman as an
exception to the otherwise universal rule of Citizens
United, applicable at the state as well as the national
level, and to out-of-state as well as foreign outside
interests. It does so by drawing parallels between
legal efforts to police national and state boundaries
in politics, and assessing the competing rights claims
of outsiders to cross those boundaries and participate
fully in domestic politics. The article suggests that a
structural constitutional principle of political com-
munity supports certain state regulations, but not pro-
hibitions, of outside influence across a range of
political activities.
The argument proceeds from theory to doc-
trine to practice. Part I reviews the structural and
historical basis for the constitutional concern
about outside influence. The republican form of
government the Constitution establishes at the fed-
eral level and guarantees at the state level requires
basic conditions of self-government that limit out-
side influence. Part II considers the gnarled doc-
trinal roots of Bluman, and how they might help
support state, as well as national, safeguards against
outside influence. The political function doctrine
developed under the Equal Protection Clause can
begin to fill the gap Citizens United exposed in
First Amendment’s application to outside influence.
That doctrine, rooted in ‘‘[t]he sovereign’s obliga-
tion to preserve the basic conception of a political
community,’’ should be understood to extend in a
limited fashion to outside influence from out-of-
state interests. Part III proposes an important state
interest in regulating, but not excluding, partici-
pation in state and local politics by out-of-state
interests. It suggests some applications of ‘‘the
basic conception of a political community’’ to out-
side influence in several spheres of political activity.
This doctrinal move harmonizes the First Amend-
ment’s principle of speaker neutrality in election
law with the Constitution’s broader commitment
to self-governance through the republican form of
government.
I. WHOSE REPUBLIC(S)?
Outside influence matters. It matters because
limiting the participation of outsiders is fundamen-
tal to the definition of a political community. That
national political community consists of many con-
federated subnational political communities, states
and localities. For all the attention politicians, the
media, and voters pay to the national government,
state and local boundaries persistently structure
the civic life of Americans. Even in an increasingly
globalized, online world, almost everything that
happens to citizens before they get to the polling
place happens within the structures of state and
local government: family, home, school, work,
play, church, community. The margins of these
structures have messy edges, and cases can and
should be made for overlapping national claims of
citizenship’s rights and duties. Yet state and local
communities will have the primary claim of citizen-
ship as long as we live in a physical world practi-
cally circumscribed by the radius of daily life.
Still, this principle of a basic conception of a polit-
ical community—of insiders distinguished from
outsiders—is nowhere expressed in so much consti-
tutional text. Instead it must be drawn from the
structure of the political community the Constitu-
tion establishes.
Concern about outsiders runs through the Con-
stitution. Under the Foreign Emoluments clause,
for example, federal officials cannot receive ‘‘any
present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind
whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State,’’
without the consent of Congress.17 Along with this
clause, Zephyr Teachout’s argument that the Framers’
‘‘obsession with foreign influence derived from a fear
that foreign powers and individuals had no basic
investment in the well-being of the country,’’18 was
17U.S. Const. art. I, x 9, cl. 8.
18See Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 91 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 341, 346–73 (2009) but see Seth Barrett Tillman,
The Original Public Meaning of the Foreign Emoluments
Clause: A Reply to Prof. Zephyr Teachout, 107 NW. U.L.Rev.
Colloguy 180 (2013) (arguing the clause applies only to
unelected federal positions).
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the only authority relied upon by the Citizens United
dissent in its discussion of foreign influence.19 As
the dissent put it, ‘‘[w]hen they brought our constitu-
tional order into being, the Framers had their minds
trained on a threat to republican self-government
that this Court has lost sight of.’’20
Outside influence also colors the composition of
the national government from the States. ‘‘[T]he
People of the several States’’ elect Congress.21
Each of the people’s representatives in Congress
must ‘‘be an Inhabitant of that State in which he
shall be chosen.’’22 Presidential electors ‘‘shall
meet in their respective States.’’23 These provisions,
Teachout explains, are rooted in what George
Mason explained as a fear that ‘‘foreigners and
adventurers,’’ outsiders in other words, would
‘‘make laws for us & govern us.’’24 By default
rule, the Constitution provides states the power to
prescribe ‘‘[t]he Times, Places and Manner of hold-
ing Elections for Senators and Representatives,’’25
subject to alteration by Congress. Except as
expressly provided by the voting rights amend-
ments, the Constitution leaves to the States the
qualifications of the electors in state and federal
elections, adopting for congressional elections
‘‘the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the
most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.’’26
States also have the power to direct the manner,
though not the time, of appointment for presidential
electors.27 The original Constitution says little
about state elections beyond repeated implications
that the states will have legislatures, and some
form of executive and judicial officers.28 Beyond
this, the Constitution simply requires the national
government to guarantee the states a ‘‘Republican
Form of Government.’’29
The Guarantee Clause distills the Constitution’s
concerns about outside influence at the national
level into republicanism, and through this maps
these concerns onto state governments. In a part of
the Constitution that primarily protects outsiders’
privileges and immunities30 and judgments,31
Article IV also ‘‘guarantee[s] to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government.’’32 Tak-
ing this guarantee in its broadest terms, in James
Madison’s terms simply as ‘‘a Government in
which the scheme of representation takes place,’’33
it reflects the system the Constitution establishes
for the national government in the systems the Con-
stitution presupposes for the state governments. The
republican form of government presupposes a ‘‘pub-
lic’’ to whom the ‘‘res,’’ the state object, belongs.
This, in turn, implies that there are those to whom
the state does not belong. Like the national system,
those state subsystems also need defense against
what Madison called ‘‘aristocratic or monarchical
innovations,’’ particularly factions that may ‘‘pos-
sess such a superiority of pecuniary resources, of
military talents and experience, or of secret suc-
cours from foreign powers.’’34
The question remains whether those ‘‘foreign
powers’’ against which the Constitution defends
must be exclusively foreign to the nation, or may
also be within the nation but foreign to a state. The
republican guarantee protects both spheres against
foreign influence. The guarantee preserves the
Union by protecting each state from outside influ-
ence exerted by factions from other states. ‘‘The
influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame
within their particular States, but will be unable to
spread a general conflagration through the other
States,’’ Madison writes in The Federalist No. 10.35
Assuming federalist protections against outside
influence in the states, any ‘‘improper or wicked
19Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 948 n. 51 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing), citing Zephyr Teachout, supra n. 18 at 393 n. 245 (2009).
20Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 964 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
21U.S. Const. art. I, x 2, cl. 1 (House); U.S. Const. amend.
XVII, x 1 (Senate).
22U.S. Const. art. x 2, cl. 2 (House); U.S. Const. art. I, x 3, cl.
3 (Senate).
23U.S. Const. amend. XII.
24Teachout, supra n. 18 at 358, quoting Notes of James Madi-
son, (Aug. 8, 1787), in 2 The Records of the Federal Convention
of 1787, at 216 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) (1937).
25U.S. Const. art. I, x 4; see also U.S. Const. amend. XVII
(providing for direct election of Senators).
26U.S. Const. art. I x 2; U.S. Const. amend. XVII.
27U.S. Const. art. II, x 1.
28See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. VI (‘‘The Senators and Represen-
tatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State
Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the
United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath
or Affirmation, to support this Constitution’’).
29U.S. Const. art. IV, x 4.
30U.S. Const. art. IV, x 2, cl. 1 (‘‘The Citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens
in the several States.’’).
31U.S. Const. art. IV, x 1 (‘‘Full Faith and Credit shall be given
in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceed-
ings of every other State.’’).
32U.S. Const. art. IV, x 4.
33The Federalist No. 10, at 62. (James Madison) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961)
34The Federalist No. 43, supra n. 33, at 291, 294.
35Madison, The Federalist No. 10, supra n. 33, at 64.
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project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of
the Union, than a particular member of it; in the same
proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a
particular county or district, than an entire State.’’36
The difference between national and state protections
against outside influence is a matter of degree, not of
kind. This suggests a more complicated view of the
regulation of politics than the one in which Benjamin
Bluman is categorically excluded from spending
even a dollar (or casting a single vote) in support of
candidates in the state where he lives,37 while, for
example, out-of-state organizations are categorically
included in spending nearly a million dollars in oppo-
sition to judicial candidates in another state.38
Federalism, after all, presupposes borders be-
tween insiders and outsiders within the nation,
among the states as well as between the states and
the national government. The reservation of powers39
and rights40 not enumerated by the Constitution to
the states and the people is a guarantee against
certain outside influence in a state by the federal
government representing the (other) People of the
United States. Reconstruction narrowed that reser-
vation significantly by introducing the conception
of ‘‘privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States,’’ guaranteeing all persons ‘‘equal pro-
tection of the laws,’’ and setting up the later incor-
poration of federal rights against the States.41
Most notably for the political process, the Four-
teenth Amendment generalized the prohibition
against abridging the freedoms of speech, press,
assembly, and petition.42 The Constitution also
extended the vote on the basis of race,43 sex,44
and age,45 though on this reading these amendments
expanded the definition of insiders within the states
rather than established rights of those outside the
states to exert influence. Unlike other intra-state
jurisdictional boundaries that are subject to trou-
bling border manipulation to exclude certain insid-
ers,46 state borders like national borders are all but
fixed.47 The basic scheme of representation in the
states therefore belongs to a constitutionally persis-
tent set of insiders: the people of each state who
elect and are elected to govern each state.
If state political outcomes do not generally
reflect the state’s own political balance, weighed
in terms not only of voting but all the political fac-
tors that influence politics, the state falls short of a
republican form of government. As the Court held
in Printz, ‘‘[i]t is an essential attribute of the States’
retained sovereignty that they remain independent
and autonomous within their proper sphere of
authority.’’48 Beyond the state’s own sovereignty,
outside influence may threaten the whole federal
system across the range of federal models. Each
model, in fact, depends on distinctions between
insiders and outsiders in political participation,
and some limits on outside influence. Take Heather
Gerken’s taxonomy of federalism: ‘‘(1) the de jure
autonomy associated with the sovereignty ac-
count; (2) the de facto autonomy associated with
process federalism; and (3) the power of the ser-
vant.within a cooperative federal regime.’’49
Under the state sovereignty model, limits on outside
influence simply follow from the national sover-
eignty logic of Bluman’s exclusion of foreigners
applied back to the states. Under the state autonomy
model, limits on outside influence are a precon-
dition for political safeguards of federalism, so elec-
ted officials are accountable primarily to an organic
state constituency rather than merely reflecting
national interests channeled back through the states.
Under the cooperative federalism model, limits on
outside influence ensure that states as ‘‘servants’’
provide faithful feedback on the local administra-
tion of federal policy, again rather than merely
reflecting national perspectives on the policy. No
form of federalism, and therefore no form of
36Id.
37Bluman v. Federal Election Comm’n, 800 F.Supp.2d 281
(D.D.C. 2011) (three-judge court).
38See Ian C. Bartrum, Constitutional Rights and Judicial
Indpendence: Lessons from Iowa, 88 Wash. U. L. Rev.
1047, 1048 (2011) (describing overwhelming spending of the
National Organization for Marriage in Iowa’s supreme court
elections).
39U.S. Const. amend. X.
40U.S. Const. amend. IX.
41U.S. Const. amend. XIV, x 1.
42U.S. Const. amend. I.
43U.S. Const. amend. XV, x 1.
44U.S. Const. amend. XIX, x 1.
45U.S. Const. amend. XXVI, x 1.
46See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960)
(holding the redefinition of Tuskegee, Alabama borders ‘‘to
remove from the city all save only four or five of its 400
Negro voters while not removing a single white voter or resi-
dent’’ violates the Fifteenth Amendment).
47See U.S. Const. art. IV, x 3, cl. 1 (‘‘no new State shall be
formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State;
nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States,
or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the
States concerned as well as of the Congress.’’).
48Printz v. United States, 521U.S. 898, 928 (1997).
49Heather Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
1549, 1560 (2012).
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government under the Constitution, works without
limits on outside influence in the states.
Those limits need not be prohibitive. Any struc-
tural theory of regulating outside influence among
the states must reconcile with the equally powerful
rights doctrine reflected in Citizens United that
‘‘voters must be free to obtain information from
diverse sources in order to determine how to cast
their votes.’’50 Even if the threat of outside influence
justifies excluding foreign speakers from participa-
tion in national politics, the total exclusion from one
state of citizens of other states raises more serious
constitutional and practical concerns. Even under
a strong conception of federalism, state politics is
semi-autonomous at best, particularly when drawn
to include the state’s elections of federal representa-
tives. The economic and social, as well as political,
integration of the union gives outsiders legitimate
interests in influencing politics across state lines.51
To be sure, the Constitution emphasizes open inter-
state borders for commercial traffic52 and civil priv-
ileges and immunities,53 not political participation.
Yet state borders are much more permeable to polit-
ical activity than national political borders. National
political issues cross borders, and media markets,
Internet coverage, and interest groups (including
national political parties) follow. One way of recon-
ciling limits on outside influence with the speaker
neutrality rationale of Citizens United is to hold
that states may regulate outside political speech,
but may not suppress that speech altogether.54
II. BLUMAN GROUPS: INSIDERS
AND OUTSIDERS IN CONSTITUTIONAL
DOCTRINE
Unlike the great debates in Citizens United over
whether and how the First Amendment extends to
corporations,55 there has been no parallel doctrinal
development of the First Amendment’s application
to outsiders’ participation in politics. Indeed, in
both Citizens United and its summary affirmance
in Bluman, the Court avoided the question. The
political function doctrine developed under the
Equal Protection clause may begin to fill this gap.
Bluman begins to delineate a constitutional bor-
derline that might clarify the rights of outsiders to
participate in the political process.
Federal law prohibits a ‘‘foreign national,’’ a non-
citizen who is not admitted to permanent residence,
from contributing to candidates or parties, or mak-
ing independent expenditures, in any ‘‘Federal,
State, or local election.’’56 Plaintiffs pleaded Blu-
man solely as a First Amendment case, arguing
that their campaign spending constitutes ‘‘core
political speech entitled to the strongest protection
under the First Amendment,’’ and that the law’s pro-
hibitions on foreign campaign spending are ‘‘arbi-
trary and irrational.’’57 Yet the court declined to
frame the case as part of the ‘‘great debates’’ con-
cerning the First Amendment and campaign finance
laws. Instead, according to the court, ‘‘this case rai-
ses a preliminary and foundational question about
the definition of the American political communi-
ty.’’58
This is similar to the same foundational question
outside influence poses with regard to state regula-
tions of political participation. The ‘‘definition of
the American political community,’’ as a consti-
tutional matter, includes the states as politically sep-
arate (though not wholly sovereign or autonomous)
republics. The answers, Bluman shows, are not
obvious from existing constitutional doctrine. A
pure speaker-neutrality rule under First Amendment
doctrine cannot account for outside influence unless
it subject to limitation by a sufficiently important or
compelling state interest. Outsiders in politics raise
but do not resolve what that interest may be. Even as
to exclusion of foreign citizens, a national security
interest is unlikely to fit a broad prohibition on
participation. After Citizens United, no broad con-
ception of ‘‘foreign corruption’’ would serve to
exclude other American citizens from political par-
ticipation in states. Only an appropriately broad
conception of the political community, such as
50Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 899.
51See Part III.A, infra.
52See, e.g., Art. I, x 8, cl. 2 (congressional power over interstate
commerce); Art. I, x 10 cl. 2 and 3 (restricting state duties on
imports and exports).
53See Art. IV, x 2, cl. 1 (‘‘The Citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the sev-
eral States.’’).
54Cf. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 886.
55See Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 899, citing inter alia First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) and
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
562 U.S.C. x 441(e); 11 C.F.R. x 110.20(f) (extending expendi-
ture prohibition to state and local elections).
57Bluman v. Federal Election Comm’n, No. 1:10-cv-01766,
Complaint at 6–7 (Oct. 19, 2010).
58Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 286.
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that developed in equal protection law for alienage
classifications in political function cases, could
support a similarly broad principle distinguish-
ing between insiders and outsiders in political
participation.
A. The First Amendment and the limits
of speaker-neutrality
The Bluman court first looked to Citizens United
for its basic doctrinal framework under the First
Amendment, assuming strict scrutiny applied due
to the law’s speaker-based prohibition on campaign
expenditures.59 Conceding that ‘‘the Supreme Court
has never squarely addressed the issue’’ of foreign
campaign spending, however, the court had little
law on which to rely in the opinion.60 The Supreme
Court expressly ‘‘did not reach the question whether
the Government has a compelling interest in pre-
venting foreign individuals or associations from
influencing our Nation’s political process.’’61 To
amplify the Court’s signal that it was aware of
exactly the issue it was avoiding, the opinion in
Citizens United then cited the foreign campaign
contribution and expenditure law at issue in Blu-
man.62 Despite this, the court in Bluman relied
on the Citizens United dissent’s criticism of the
majority’s ‘‘categorical approach to speaker identi-
ty’’ as ‘‘untenable’’ and surprising, given the law
and the Framers’ longstanding distinctions be-
tween foreigners and citizens.63 Paradoxically, it
was the force of the Citizens United dissent on
this point—and, it may be assumed, the majority’s
lack of a response to it—that the Bluman court
found ‘‘to be a telling and accurate indicator of
where the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence stands
on the question of foreign contributions and expen-
ditures.’’64
There the supporting First Amendment doctrine
ran out. Conceding ‘‘that foreign citizens in the
United States enjoy many of the same constitutional
rights that U.S. citizens do,’’65 the court reached
back to a McCarthy-Era case upholding the deporta-
tion of aliens, who had resided in the United States
for decades, on the grounds of their past member-
ship in the Communist Party.66 Yet that case, Hari-
siades v. Shaughnessy, departed from the Court’s
then-recent embrace in Bridges v. Wixon of the prin-
ciple that ‘‘[f]reedom of speech and of press is
accorded aliens residing in this country.’’67 Bridges
previously led the Court to a much more skeptical
view of a similar record of Communist Party affili-
ation in its reversal of a deportation order. And
Harisiades had long since been cabined as exempli-
fying the broad scope of the federal government
powers over immigration.68 The Supreme Court’s
most recent citation of the case in the First Amend-
ment context occurred twenty-five years ago in
which a dissent reframed it, rather generously to
the government given the Harisiades defendants’
disavowals of violence, as an incitement case
involving unprotected speech.69 No simple approach
under the First Amendment alone could answer the
question of how to define American political com-
munities and their interests in regulating outside
influence.
B. Equal Protection and ‘‘the sovereign’s
obligation to preserve the basic conception
of a political community’’
With nothing left to say about the First Amend-
ment, the Bluman court turned to cases involving
distinctions in political participation rights under
the Equal Protection Clause. Assuming that strict
scrutiny applied, the court asked if ‘‘the sovereign’s
obligation to preserve the basic conception of a
political community’’ is a sufficiently compelling
59Id.
60Id. at 289.
61Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 911.
62Id.
63Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 289, citing Citizens United, 130
S.Ct. at 948 n. 51 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 289.
65Id. at 286.
66Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 591–92 (1952), cit-
ing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
67Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945), citing Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
68See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2498
(2012) (‘‘The federal power to determine immigration policy
is well-settled’’); Plyler v. Doe, 456 U.S. 202, 225 (1982)
(‘‘Drawing upon this power [under Art. I, x 8, cl. 4 to establish
a uniform Rule of Naturalization], upon its plenary authority
with respect to foreign relations and international commerce,
and upon the inherent power of a sovereign to close its borders,
Congress has developed a complex scheme governing admis-
sion to our Nation and status within our borders.’’).
69See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 397 (1987). In
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Court distanced itself
from any suggestion that ‘‘a regulation of independent speech
would pass constitutional muster, even if the Government
were to show that such speech benefits foreign terrorist organi-
zations.’’ Id., 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2730 (2010).
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interest to limit foreign participation in cam-
paigns.70 This formulation of the government’s
interest quotes Foley v. Connelie, which upheld
under rational basis review New York’s exclusion
of aliens from the state police force because the
people have a right ‘‘to be governed by their citizen
peers.’’71 There, the Supreme Court distinguished
the prior application of strict scrutiny to alienage
classifications by explaining that ‘‘although we
extend to aliens the right to education and public
welfare, along with the ability to earn a livelihood
and engage in licensed professions, the right to gov-
ern is reserved to citizens.’’72 The sovereign right of
self-governance applies to a classification when ‘‘it
involves discretionary decisionmaking, or execution
of policy, which substantially affects members of
the political community.’’73
Although these political function cases involve
public employment, the issue is on the periphery
of a principle that has at its core political participa-
tion. In its most comprehensive discussion of this
political participation principle, Sugarman v. Dou-
gall, the Supreme Court invalidated New York
City’s blanket prohibition on alien employment in
civil service positions.74 Aliens as a class, the
Court explained, are subject to heightened scru-
tiny as ‘‘a prime example of a discrete and insular
minority’’ under footnote four of Carolene Prod-
ucts.75 Therefore, although the State has a ‘‘sub-
stantial interest’’ in retaining a ‘‘broad power to
define its political community.with discrimination
against aliens, the means the State employs must be
precisely drawn in light of the acknowledged pur-
pose.’’76 At the core of this ‘‘power and responsibil-
ity’’ lies election regulation, including setting
qualifications for voting and public officers who
‘‘perform functions that go to the heart of repre-
sentative government.’’77 In that core of ‘‘matters
resting firmly within a State’s constitutional prerog-
atives,’’ the Sugarman Court noted ‘‘alienage itself
is a factor that reasonably could be employed in
defining ‘political community.’’’78
These constitutional prerogatives are, according
to Sugarman, ‘‘no more than a recognition of a
State’s historical power to exclude aliens from par-
ticipation in its democratic political institutions, and
a recognition of a State’s constitutional responsibil-
ity for the establishment and operation of its own
government.’’79 The constitutional recognition of
this responsibility, in turn, is rooted in the Guarantee
Clause and the Tenth Amendment.80 As these provi-
sions suggest, the special status of State power to
define its own political community precedes the
Constitution and is not merely the residue of a fed-
eral power over non-citizens of the national political
community. By ‘‘aliens,’’ the Sugarman Court’s
supporting citation to Pope v. Williams suggests
that States hold this power over State outsiders
regardless of federal citizenship status. In that
case, the Court upheld a Maryland law requiring a
United States citizen also to declare his intent to
vote as a Maryland citizen, ‘‘provided, of course,
no discrimination is made between individuals in
violation of the Federal Constitution.’’81 Emphasiz-
ing the point, the Sugarman Court also cited Luther
v. Borden, in which the Court declined to adjudicate
the question of which was the legitimate govern-
ment of Rhode Island after the Dorr rebellion, not-
ing that ‘‘the sovereignty in every State resides in
the people of the State.’’82
Since Sugarman, the courts have honed the ‘‘po-
litical function’’ doctrine of alienage classifications
in a series of cases that, by the Supreme Court’s own
acknowledgment, ‘‘have not formed an unwavering
line over the years.’’83 Yet all of them rest on ‘‘the
general principle that some state functions are so
bound up with the operation of the State as a gov-
ernmental entity as to permit the exclusion from
those functions of all persons who have not become
part of the process of self-government.’’84 The
Supreme Court’s most recent reliance on the princi-
ple came two decades ago in Gregory v. Ashcroft,
where in upholding Missouri’s mandatory retire-
ment age for state judges it noted the Court had ‘‘ac-
knowledged the unique nature of state decisions that
‘go to the heart of representative government.’’’85 If
70Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 287, quoting Foley v. Connelie,




74Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
75Id. at 642, quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971).
76Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 643.
77Id. at 647.
78Id. at 648–49.
79Id. at 648 (citations omitted).
80Id. citing U.S. Const. art. IV, x 4; U.S. Const. amend. X.
81193 U.S. 621 (1904).
8248 U.S. 1, 47 (1849).
83Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 72 (1979).
84Id. at 74–75.
85 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991).
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this extraordinarily broad self-governance principle
can support relatively ill-fitting alienage classifica-
tions across a range of public employment at its
periphery, it also may support similar outsider clas-
sifications across a range of political participation at
its core. Yet despite its breadth, courts have not
relied on the principle recently, and have not relied
on the principle at all in political participation cases,
until Bluman.
C. Which Sovereign? What Community?
Whose Conception?
In Bluman the court holds that limits on alien
campaign activity are part of the sovereign’s obliga-
tion to preserve the basic conception of a political
community. Both the subject and object of this prin-
ciple are clear only in application to the issue pre-
sented in the case. Who is the sovereign? What is
the community? And whose conception of that
community controls? In the context of the federal
law at issue in Bluman, the sovereign is We the People
of the United States, acting through Congress to
preserve the nation’s basic conception of our federal
republic by excluding aliens from political par-
ticipation. But the principle itself originated in
support of state laws enacted by a subnational pop-
ular sovereign, though those laws also excluded (na-
tional) aliens from the (subnational) sovereign’s
basic conception of a (subnational) political commu-
nity. While Bluman aligns the federal sovereign with
the federal community’s exclusion of aliens, the cases
from which it draws this principle support the state
sovereign only insofar as the state preserves the fed-
eral conception of a political community, as defined
by a federal definition of national citizenship.
There is, therefore, a mismatch in the state polit-
ical function cases that Bluman exposes through its
own more consistent application of the principle at
the federal level. When the federal Supreme Court
upholds a state law as ‘‘part of the sovereign’s obli-
gation to preserve the basic conception of a political
community,’’ it could mean several things. The sub-
ject of the obligation to preserve (the sovereign), the
object of the preservation (the basic conception),
and the conception itself (the political community)
might all be or belong to the federal or state govern-
ments. What supports the foreign campaign expen-
diture prohibition in Bluman is that the federal
government has an obligation to preserve a federal
conception of a federal community. The strongest
nationalist reading of the principle in the state polit-
ical function cases is that state government has the
obligation to preserve a federal conception of a fed-
eral community, and the state law simply serves
some federal power. If there is a compelling interest
in the law, it is compelling because it is a federal
interest. The strongest federalist reading of the prin-
ciple is that the state government has the obligation
to preserve a state conception of a state community,
and the state law simply does not conflict with, or
overrides, any potentially competing federal powers
or rights.86
What matters most here is first, who gets to con-
ceive the community, and second, whose obligation
it is to preserve that conception. The political func-
tion cases suggest two divergent answers to the first
question. The Supreme Court has invoked the prin-
ciple in cases involving alienage classifications.
This suggests the Court views the state laws as pre-
serving a federal conception of a political commu-
nity, namely United States citizenship and the
legitimacy of entitlements (such as certain forms
of public employment) that may be associated
with national citizenship. Yet if this were so, the
Bluman analysis would not be so novel in terms of
analyzing federal law. If the political function
cases drew on a federal conception of a political
community to support state laws, that federal con-
ception should also appear in cases supporting fed-
eral laws, or at least federal laws themselves. It does
not.87 It would be odd if the political function cases
rest upon a federal conception of federal political
community that is robust enough to trump strict
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of state
laws, yet not worth mentioning when scrutinizing
similar federal laws under the Constitution. Bluman,
it turns out, is the exception that proves the rule.
State laws that exclude aliens from political func-
tions must be saved, if at all, as states preserving
their own basic conceptions of state political com-
munities. In other words, state regulation of outside
influence fulfills the (state) sovereign’s obligation
86There are more complicated but familiar intermediate formu-
lations too. The Guarantee Clause, for example, might be read
to say that the federal government has the obligation to preserve
a federal conception of a state community (the republican form
of government), although given the breadth of that conception
and its origin in the Constitution itself, it might also be consid-
ered the states’ conceptions of a state community.
87See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2499 (2012).
126 JOHNSTONE
to preserve the (state’s) basic conception of a (state)
political community. On this reading of Bluman and
the political function cases, the doctrine reinforces
the structural constitutional protections of self-gov-
ernment against outside influence. It takes at face
value the Court’s explanation that ‘‘[t]he rationale
behind the political-function exception is that
within broad boundaries a State may establish its
own form of government and limit the right to gov-
ern to those who are full-fledged members of the
political community.’’88 It accepts the Court’s insis-
tence that ‘‘[s]elf-government, whether direct or
through representatives, begins by defining the
scope of the community of the governed and thus
of the governors as well.’’89 Because it is the state’s
conception of its own political community that gov-
erns, one implication of the principle is that a state
may expand the right to political participation
beyond the federal government’s conception. This
is consistent with historical practice respecting
state policies granting the vote to aliens.90 Subject
to other textual constitutional parameters, the state’s
basic conception may be more or less inclusive of
outside influence than the federal citizenship base-
line, so long as it is in fact the state’s conception
that controls.
If the state as sovereign has not just the power
but the obligation to preserve the basic concep-
tion of a political community, an obligation
owed by the state government to its People, then
that basic conception should be of, by, and for
those People. A citizen in her State capacity
might ask: if a political community is so basic a
conception as to provide a constitutionally com-
pelling state interest in preserving it against out-
siders, why should their (federal) or our shared
(federal) conception of federal citizenship be any
more worthy of preservation than our own (state)
conception of state citizenship? If this is the case
for alienage classifications, how might it support
more general distinctions against outsider partici-
pation in politics? The court’s innovation in Blu-
man is to ground the structural constitutional
concerns with outside influence in equal protec-
tion doctrine that accommodates the rights claims
of outsiders to political participation. The doctrine
suggests that beyond a core of office-holding and
voting, regulation of political participation is
fairly susceptible to distinctions based on who is
in, and who is out, of a state’s basic conception
of its own political community.
III. REGULATING OUTSIDE INFLUENCE
The constitutional regime governing the law of
politics, always dynamic, has shifted. After Citizens
United reiterated the limited scope of compelling
interests in regulating politics, much of the remaining
legal structure lies in the constitutional limbo of
intermediate scrutiny and balancing tests. Sometimes
the courts refer to it with ironic imprecision as ‘‘ex-
acting scrutiny.’’91 This middle-tier scrutiny is inher-
ently unstable in application, balanced as it is
between deference and suspicion.92 Recent decisions
consider under some form of intermediate scrutiny
campaign contribution limits,93 corporate campaign
contribution prohibitions,94 coordinated party expen-
ditures,95 campaign finance disclosure,96 and ballot
issue petition disclosure.97 Lower courts apply a sim-
ilar level of scrutiny, based on important state inter-
ests, to contribution prohibitions on contractors and
lobbyists,98 and on corporations.99 Elsewhere, the
88Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 221 (1984).
89Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439–40 (1982).
90See Raskin, Jamin B. Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The His-
torical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suf-
frage, 141 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1391 (1993) (reviewing the
history of alien suffrage and arguing that the Constitution nei-
ther forbids nor compels states to grant the vote to aliens).
91See Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 914 (‘‘The Court has sub-
jected [disclosure] these requirements to ‘exacting scrutiny,’
which requires a ‘substantial relation’ between the disclosure
requirement and a ‘sufficiently important’ governmental inter-
est.’’ But see United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2543
(2012) (applying strict scrutiny, explaining ‘‘[w]hen content-
based speech regulation is in question, however, exacting
scrutiny is required.’’) (emphasis added); McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (‘‘When a law
burdens core political speech, we apply ‘exacting scrutiny,’
and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to
serve an overriding state interest.’’).
92See Anthony Johnstone, A Madisonian Case for Disclosure,
19 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 413, 419–25 (2012).
93Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 247 (2006) (opinion of
Breyer, J.), citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1976).
94Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146,
162 (2003).
95Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 437 (2001).
96See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914.
97See John Doe #1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2818 (2010).
98See Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189 (2d
Cir. 2010); see also Wagner v. Federal Election Comm’n, 854
F. Supp. 2d 83 (D.D.C. 2012) (applying intermediate scrutiny
to federal contractor contribution ban under both the First
Amendment and the Equal Protection component of the Fifth
Amendment), vacated, No. 12-5365 (D.C. Cir. May 31, 2013).
99United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F. 3d 611, 617 (4th Cir.
2012), cert denied, No. 12-579 (Feb. 25, 2013).
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Supreme Court approaches something like inter-
mediate scrutiny on the sliding scale introduced
by Anderson v. Celebrezze100 and Burdick v.
Takushi101 for candidate ballot access, and applied
it or suggested its application in some cases to polit-
ical party association,102 ballot issue petitioning,103
and voter identification requirements.104 While the
intermediate standard’s fluidity may be a threat to
the orderly development of election law doctrine
in these critical regulatory areas, it also represents
an opportunity for states and their citizens to
make a case for a broader universe of ‘‘important
state interests.’’ The concern about outside influ-
ence, potentially compelling as to national outsid-
ers, also qualifies as at least an important interest
in regulation of state outsiders in politics.
As policymakers recalibrate the means and ends
of political regulation under the post-Citizens
United regime, outside influence may become a
more central subject of discussion for several
reasons. Voting qualifications provide the most
developed example, and may suggest some con-
siderations for other stages in the political process.
In petitioning processes, election administration
integrity concerns might draw qualifications for
voter registration drives, petitioning, and similar
procedures more closely around residency to more
effectively deter fraud and remedy mistakes. In
campaign finance, corporate expenditures targeted
by now-invalidated corrupt practices acts were a
kind of proxy for outside influence that states now
may attempt to regulate more directly. In lobbying
regulation, the nationalization of state politics facil-
itates the organization and mobilization of outside
interest groups around state legislative agendas,
renewing ancient suspicions of ‘‘adventurers’’
authoring law from outside the political community.
In each of these spheres and others, the constitu-
tional analysis of outside influence lacks clarity.
This article proposes a clarifying rule. Residency
should be a non-suspect qualification for non-
prohibitory regulations of political participation, the
kind that ‘‘do not prevent anyone from speaking’’
and are therefore subject to less-than-strict scruti-
ny,105 so long as the residency qualification does
not impose other constitutionally relevant burdens.
In other words, direct limits on outside influence
alone should never amount to a severe burden on
political participation sufficient to trigger strict
scrutiny. As a matter of fit between means and
ends, the basic conception of a political community
is a sufficiently important interest to justify distinc-
tions between insiders and outsiders in political
participation, again in the absence of any other
constitutionally relevant burden. Therefore, courts
should not offer nonresidents, or outsiders, any spe-
cial protections of political participation beyond
those recognized generally for all participants.
The constitutionality of voting qualifications are a
model: other than the right to move and establish
residency as an insider, courts generally do not sus-
pect voting distinctions based on insider status as a
resident, or outsider status as a nonresident.
A. Voting
The modern canon of voting qualification cases
demonstrates the inside-outside distinction as a geo-
graphical concept, and suggests some of the line-
drawing difficulties at the margins. That canon
begins with Carrington v. Rash,106 a case involving
Texas’s definition of resident active duty members
of the military as outsiders. Those members, ‘‘if
they are in fact residents, with the intention of mak-
ing Texas their home indefinitely, they, as all other
qualified residents, have a right to an equal oppor-
tunity for political representation.’’107 The Court
reinforced the residency distinction in Kramer v.
Union Free School Dist. No. 15,108 rejecting
under strict scrutiny any categorical distinctions
100460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
101504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (less than severe burdens ‘‘trigger
less exacting review, and a State’s important regulatory interests
will usually be enough to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restrictions’’) (quotations omitted).
102See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351
(1997).
103See Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation,
Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999) (referring to ‘‘State’s substantial inter-
ests in regulating the ballot-initiative process’’); but see Meyer
v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988) (‘‘the burden that Colorado
must overcome to justify this criminal law [banning paid peti-
tion circulators] is well-nigh insurmountable’’).
104See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S.Ct.
1610, 1624 (2008) (weighing interests as ‘‘neutral and suffi-
ciently strong to require use to reject petitioners’ facial attack
on the statute’’); see also id. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(Burdick ‘‘calls for application of a deferential ‘‘important reg-
ulatory interests’’ standard for nonsevere, nondiscriminatory
restrictions, reserving strict scrutiny for laws that severely
restrict the right to vote’’).
105Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. 876, 914 (2010), quoting McCon-
nell v. FEC, 501 U.S. 93, 201 (2003).
106380 U.S. 89 (1965).
107Id. at 94.
108395 U.S. 621 (1969).
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among residents based on those who might be ‘‘pri-
marily interested’’ or ‘‘primarily affected’’ by a
school election.109 In Dunn v. Blumstein,110 invalid-
ating a one-year state residency requirement to vote,
the Court refined its theory of residents as insiders.
Tennessee defended the law in part on the claim that
new residents may not yet share a common interest
in the community.111 Again the Court rejected the
distinction among residents. ‘‘[T]he fact that newly
arrived [Tennesseeans] may have a more national
outlook than longtime residents, or even may
retain a viewpoint characteristic of the region
from which they have come, is a constitutionally
impermissible reason for depriving them of their
chance to influence the electoral vote of their
new home State.’’112
Still, there remains a categorical difference
between residents and non-residents. ‘‘States have
the power to require that voters be bona fide resi-
dents of the relevant political subdivision,’’113 the
Court explained, because ‘‘[a]n appropriately
defined and uniformly applied requirement of
bona fide residence may be necessary to preserve
the basic conception of a political community, and
therefore could withstand close constitutional scru-
tiny.’’114 The constitutional line the Court draws at
residency between political insiders and outsiders
may be formalistic, but no more so than the lines
the Constitution itself draws among the states. San-
ford Levinson notes in respect to the similar issue of
citizenship, ‘‘a conception of citizenship as a surro-
gate for shared interests is both underinclusive and
overinclusive,’’ because ‘‘the universe of people
whose interests are vitally affected by any given
election is far larger than the universe of those
who are allowed to participate,’’ yet ‘‘the set of peo-
ple sharing the (proper) values may be far smaller
than the set of people designated as citizens.’’115
This critique extends to the logic of outsider elec-
tioneering in Bluman, too. For example, Zephyr
Teachout acknowledges the competing values of
outsiders to participate in making policies in other
jurisdictions that might impact them more than
those of their own government, and of insiders to
maintain their sovereignty against dilution by
every person who may be touched by extraterritorial
application of policies.116 She also recognizes the
interests of both insiders and outsiders are similar:
‘‘self-government and free speech.’’117 Yet the
lines between inside and outside exist, and some
of them are hard-wired into the Constitution. The
Supreme Court has, as it observed in Holt Civic
Club v. Tuscaloosa, ‘‘uniformly recognized that a
government unit may legitimately restrict the right
to participate in its political processes to those
who reside within its borders.’’118 The Court’s gen-
eral refusal to consider gray areas in scrutinizing
residential voting qualifications at least has the vir-
tue of clarifying those lines that are already there, so
insiders and outsiders each enter the political pro-
cess knowing where they stand at its most crucial
stage of voting. However, the conflict between the
two increases, and becomes more complicated, out-
side of the voting booth.
B. Petitioning
The act of petitioning for a ballot issue or candi-
date ballot access combines the vote-like signature
on the petition with the speech-like circulation of
the petition. Excluding outsiders from signing peti-
tions is uncontroversial. Regulating outsiders who
circulate petitions gives rise to a clash between the
outsiders who support the petition issue and state
residents who have an interest in ‘‘promoting trans-
parency and accountability in the electoral pro-
cess,’’ reflected in the state’s conception of ‘‘the
109Id. at 631.
110405 U.S. 330 (1972).
111Id. at 354.
112Id. at 355–56, quoting Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 53–54
(1969) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
113Id. at 343.
114Id. at 343–44.
115Sanford Levinson, Suffrage and Community: Who Should
Vote?, 41 Fla. L. Rev. 545, 557 (1989). See also Holt Civic
Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (‘‘The criterion of geographical residency is thus
entirely arbitrary when applied to this case’’ involving a city’s
extraterritorial police jurisdiction over neighboring residents
who lack the right to vote in city elections). Cf. Wit v. Berman,
306 F.3d 1256, 1261–62 (2d Cir. 2002) (Winter, J.) (‘‘Particu-
larly in modern times, domicile is very often a poor proxy for
a voter’s stake in electoral outcomes because many of an indi-
vidual voter’s varied interests are affected by outcomes in elec-
tions in which they do not vote.. Domicile as a rule may have
its philosophical defects, therefore, but it has enormous practi-
cal advantages over the alternatives. It almost always insures
that a voter has some stake in the electoral outcome in the domi-
ciliary district and almost always does not involve large num-
bers of disputes over where one may vote.’’).
116Zephyr Teachout, Extraterritorial Electioneering and The
Globalization of American Elections, 27 Berkeley J. Int’l L.
162 (2009).
117Id. at 190.
118Holt Civic Club, 439 U.S. at 68–69.
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proper function of a democracy.’’119 In Buckley v.
American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc.,120
the Supreme Court considered Colorado’s regula-
tion of the ballot issue petitioning process, including
a requirement that all petition circulators be regis-
tered voters. Under what appears to be intermediate
scrutiny, the Court invalidated the registration
requirement because it ‘‘cuts down the number of
message carriers in the ballot-access arena without
impelling cause.’’121 Yet it assumed ‘‘that a resi-
dence requirement would be upheld as a needful
integrity-policing matter.’’122 The requirement was
not challenged in the case, but all nine members
of the Court suggested their support of residency
as a means of ‘‘policing lawbreakers among peti-
tion circulators.’’123 Such residency requirements
are common and increasingly important safe-
guards of the integrity of state petition processes.
Nineteen states and the District of Columbia have
adopted state residency requirements for petition
circulators.124
States’ suspicion of outsiders in the petition pro-
cess arises from a history of circulator fraud and the
administrative necessity of identifying, locating,
and haling circulators into court on short notice.
This interest goes beyond security from fraud, and
includes a voter’s—as well as a candidate’s or initia-
tive proponent’s—reasonable expectation that any
challenge to the petition process will be resolved
based on facts rather than negative inferences
drawn from a circulator’s unavailability as a wit-
ness. Where circulators cannot be located in
response to petition challenges, courts must resort
to potentially sweeping petition invalidations even
when the extent of fraud may be limited. In one
case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court explained that
‘‘the integrity of the initiative process in many
ways hinges on the trustworthiness and veracity of
the circulator’’ because ‘‘the Secretary and this
Court have no ability to ascertain whether a partic-
ular voter actually signed a petition.’’125 Therefore,
‘‘residency requirements ensure that when such
issues arise, the circulators will be Oklahoma resi-
dents who may be located within state lines and
be subject to service for appearance in Oklahoma
Courts.’’126 Finding ‘‘overwhelming evidence’’ of
‘‘involvement of out-of-state circulators in the sig-
nature gathering process establishing a pervasive
pattern of wrongdoing and fraud,’’127 the court con-
cluded that ‘‘if we do not take the opportunity to
address the issue of the effect of out-of-state intru-
sions into a process reserved to bona fide residents
of the State of Oklahoma, the problem will only
grow and will present itself as a part of essentially
every citizen circulation.’’128
Similarly, in a Montana challenge to more than
64,000 signatures collected by non-resident petition
circulators who had used false addresses and ‘‘bait
and switch’’ tactics, neither the challengers nor the
proponents were able to locate the suspect circula-
tors or present them as witnesses at the challenge
hearing.129 Although the proponents sought more
time for discovery, the court explained the need
for ‘‘rapid action by the parties and the courts
between the time an initiative qualifies for the
ballot—typically in mid-July—and the date on
which voters cast ballots in the first week of
November.’’130 Based on the testimony from fewer
than a dozen voters, and the proponents’ failure to
present a single circulator witness to rebut or limit
the fraud allegations, the Montana Supreme Court
invalidated more than 64,000 signatures gathered
by non-residents, ‘‘[a]s it was impossible to
119Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2819 (2010).
120525 U.S. 182 (1999).
121Id. at 197.
122Id.
123Id. at 196. See see id. at 230 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (‘‘I
would not quarrel’’ with a holding ‘‘that a State may limit peti-
tion circulation to its own residents’’); id. at 217 (O’Connor, J.,
joined by Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part) (‘‘I believe that the requirement that initiative
petition circulators be registered voters is a permissible regula-
tion of the electoral process.’’) (citation omitted); id. at 211
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (assuming ‘‘the
State has a compelling interest in ensuring that all circulators
are residents,’’ and agreeing that ‘‘the State’s asserted interest
could be more precisely achieved through a residency require-
ment.’’).
124Alaska Stat. x 15.45.105; Ariz. Rev. Stat. xx 16-321(D), 19-
114; Cal. Elections Code xx 102, 8451, 8066, 9021; Colo. Rev.
Stat. xx 1-4-905, 1-40-112(1); Conn. Gen. Stat. x 9-453e; D.C.
Code x 1-1001.16(h)(5); Idaho Code x 34-1807; Kan. Stat. Ann.
x 25-303; Me. Const. art. IV, Pt. 3, x 20; Mich. Comp. Laws x
168.544(c); Miss. Const. art. 15, x 273(12); Mo. Rev. Stat. x
115.325(2); Mont. Code Ann. x 13-27-102(2)(a); Neb. Rev.
Stat. Ann. x 32-629(2); N.D. Const. art. III, x 2; N.D.C.C. x
16.1-01- 09(3), x 3; Ohio Rev. Code x 3503.06; Okla. Stat. tit.
34, x 3.1; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 25 x 2911(d); S.D. Cod. L. x 12-
1-3 (9); Wyo. Stat. x 22-24-107(a).









precisely identify which certified signatures were
untainted by Proponents’ signature gatherers’ various
deceptive practices.’’131 The next year, in response to
Montanans for Justice, the state legislature enacted a
residency requirement for petition circulators.132
Courts diverge on the constitutionality of exclud-
ing outsiders from the petition process, however. In
Initiative & Referendum Institute v. Jaeger, the
Eighth Circuit upheld North Dakota’s residency
requirement in a challenge brought by initiative peti-
tioners, noting that ‘‘[n]on-residents are still free to
speak to voters regarding particular measures; they
certainly may train residents on the issues involved
and may instruct them on the best way to collect sig-
natures; and they may even accompany circula-
tors.’’133 In Nader v. Brewer, the Ninth Circuit
invalidated under strict scrutiny Arizona’s residency
requirement for candidate petitions, despite its simi-
larity to the residency requirement assumed to be
constitutional in Buckley, because in a presidential
campaign ‘‘the residency requirement nevertheless
excludes from eligibility all persons who support
the candidate but who, like [presidential candidate
Ralph] Nader himself, live outside the state of Ari-
zona.’’134 Nader may be distinguished, implicitly,
on the basis of the national federal election impli-
cated by the process. Still, circuit courts continue
to invalidate petition circulator residency require-
ments under strict scrutiny for national candidates
as well as state candidates and ballot issues.135
If these challenges turned on the remoteness of
outsiders’ petition circulation from insiders’ basic
conception of a political community, they might be
reconciled with the voting qualification cases. But
to the contrary, the successful petition challenges
turn on the characterization of petition circulation
as core political speech by outsiders in the insiders’
political process, even when the outsiders make
only a thin case for an actual burden on petitioning.
The Supreme Court has not affirmed this political
speech characterization since American Constitu-
tional Law Foundation. It has, however, held in
Doe v. Reed that ‘‘[p]etition signing remains expres-
sive even when it has legal effect in the electoral pro-
cess,’’ and therefore is analogous in important ways
to the Court’s campaign finance doctrine.136
C. Campaigning
The conflict between outside influence and a
state’s basic conception of a political community
sharpens on the campaign trail. Money is mobile.
In the fundraising race, candidates will seek outside
contributions in support of, and fear outside expen-
ditures in opposition to, their campaigns; outside
contributors will seek candidates to support and
oppose. Campaign finance, therefore, is a primary
channel of outside influence. This was the argument
of 22 states and the District of Columbia, led by
New York, in a brief as amici curiae in support of
Montana and its Supreme Court’s decision uphold-
ing the Corrupt Practices Act in American Tradition
Partnership v. Bullock. As the states explained,
‘‘state campaign finance laws present the interest
in regulating nonresidents’ electoral influence in
significantly stronger form than do federal
laws.’’137 The states cataloged how nonresidents,
including but not limited to corporations, ‘‘domi-
nated spending in state elections’’:138
In 2010, spending by out-of-state groups far
exceeded local spending on communications
for and against retention of three Iowa
Supreme Court Justices. Foreign spending
was heavily one-sided, with the vast majority
131Id. at 776; see also Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Jaeger,
241 F.3d 614, 616 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing an invalidation of over
17,000 signatures when ‘‘[t]wo Utah residents who were
involved in petition irregularities left the State, and the matter
was never fully resolved.’’); Initiative Petition No. 379, 155
P.3d 32, 34, 49 (Okla. 2006) (invalidating 57,000 signatures
based on negative inferences because ‘‘[t]here is no way to
determine with any sort of accuracy exactly how many signa-
tures were collected by these out-of-state residents.’’).
132See 2007 Mont. Laws ch. 481, x 5, codified at Mont. Code
Ann. x 13-27-102(2).
133241 F.3d 614, 617 (8th Cir. 2001).
134531 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, No. 08-648
(Mar. 9, 2009).
135See Libertarian Party of Virginia v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308 (4th
Cir. 2013) (invalidating under strict scrutiny a Virgnia law
requiring nomination petition circulators to be witnessed by
state residents); Yes on Term Limits v. Savage, 550 F.3d 1023,
1031 (10th Cir. 2008) (invalidating under strict scrutiny an
Oklahoma law requiring ballot issue petition circulators to be
state residents); Nader v. Blackwell, 545 F.3d 459 (6th Cir.
2008) (invalidating under strict scrutiny an Ohio law requiring
nomination petition circulators to be state residents); cf. Krislov
v. Rednour, 226 F.3d 851, 863 (7th Cir. 2000) (invalidating
under strict scrutiny an Illinois law requiring nomination peti-
tion circulators to be registered voters within the relevant offi-
ce’s district).
136130 S.Ct. 2811, 2818 (2010).
137Amicus Curiae Bf. of New York et al. in Support of Respt.,
American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock, 20 (No. 11-1179,
132 S.Ct. 2490 (2012)).
138Id. at 21–22.
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of out-of-state funds spent in opposition to the
Justices.139 And because of independent
expenditures made by foreign corporations,
overall spending on the retention elections
was also heavily one-sided.140 All three Iowa
Justices lost their seats. And in Wisconsin,
spending on recall elections for Governor
Scott Walker and certain state senators has
already exceeded previous records based in
large part on out-of-state spending.141
In one study that anticipated these developments,
Patrick Garry, Derek Nelsen, and Candice Spurlin
found that between fifty and eighty percent of the
funding for a recent South Dakota referendum cam-
paign came from out-of-state, and concluded that
‘‘if the out-of-state money affects the outcome of
a referendum in a way that would be different
from how South Dakotans alone may have voted,
then the whole notion of horizontal federalism and
state autonomy may be undermined.’’142
The Supreme Court’s summary reversal of the
state court in American Tradition Partnership pre-
cluded the consideration of these arguments. Yet
the states are moving ahead with new approaches
to regulate outside influence in state campaigns.143
Current and potential policy options for addressing
outside influence in campaign finance include dis-
tinguishing between insiders and outsiders in contri-
bution limits and disclosure.144 Other related
policies, such as board or shareholder approval for
corporate campaign expenditures and matching
funds, also implicate the inside-outside distinction.
None of these policies exclude outsiders from polit-
ical participation. Each may regulate outside influ-
ence in a way that is substantially related to an
important state interest in preserving the basic con-
ception of a political community.
1. Contribution limits. Unlike at the federal
level, most contribution limits at the state level are
calibrated to the size of the constituency.145 A one
thousand dollar contribution in a small state’s legisla-
tive campaign has far different influence on the cam-
paign, and potentially the candidate, than the same
contribution in a federal senate campaign. Similarly,
a less populous state might calibrate its contribution
limits lower than a more populous state, based on the
costs of campaigning, relative income, and each
state’s balancing of the opportunity to participate
against the threat of corruption. Outside influence,
especially when drawn to less populated but
resource-rich states, can disrupt this balance when
there are a significant number of outside supporters
relative to constituents, when the outside supporters
have relatively more financial capacity to contrib-
ute the maximum than constituents, or when outside
supporters can make unlimited expenditures in sup-
port of or opposition to a candidate that exceeds
the constituency’s financial capacity to respond. In
any of these cases, outsiders may have more influ-
ence over a campaign, and potentially a candidate,
than constituents in campaign finance terms.
Alaska was one of the pioneer states in address-
ing outside influence. Its differential contribution
limits for residents and nonresidents prompted a
detailed consideration of nonresident campaign
contribution limits. A revision of its campaign
finance laws limited the aggregate amount a candi-
date could raise from nonresidents to a set amount
($20,000 for governor), and limited the aggregate
amount a political party or other committee could
raise from nonresidents to ten percent of total con-
tributions.146 In a challenge to the nonresident
139Roy A. Schotland, Iowa’s 2010 Judicial Election: Appropri-
ate Accountability or Rampant Passion?, 46 Ct. Rev. 118, 120–
21 (2011); Ian Bartrum, Constitutional Rights and Judicial
Independence: Lessons from Iowa, 88 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1047,
1048 (2011).
140See id.
141See, e.g., Jason Stein, Recall Cost to Government: $2.1 Mil-
lion; Amount Spent: A Record $44 Million, Milwaukee Journal
Sentinel (Sept. 20, 2011).
142Garry et al., Raising The Question Of Whether Out-Of-State
Political Contributions May Affect A Small State’s Political
Autonomy: A Case Study Of The South Dakota Voter Referen-
dum On Abortion, 55 S. D. L. Rev. 35, 46 (2010). Christopher
R. Nolen, Election Law, 41U. Rich. L. Rev. 121, 139 (2006)
(reporting that out-of-state organization contributed $2.1 mil-
lion to candidate for attorney general, prompting reforms).
The point is made more starkly as to campaign finance regula-
tion of tribal elections, given the economic pressures imposed
by Indian gaming operations on relatively small tribal elector-
ates. See Paul W. Shagen, Safeguarding the Integrity of Tribal
Elections Through Campaign Finance Regulation, 8 Cardozo
Publ. L. Policy & Ethics J. 103, 177 (2009) (‘‘for many Indian
tribes, the threat to political stability and self-governance is far
too great to leave this important area unregulated’’).
143Amicus Curiae Brief of New York et al. supra n. 137 at 7.
144See Anthony Johnstone, supra n. 92 at 462–64 (2012) (dis-
tinguishing ‘‘foreigners,’’ or outsiders, as factions for disclosure
and other campaign finance policy purposes).
145See Anthony Johnstone, Recalibrating Campaign Finance,
32 Yale L. & Pol. Rev. 101, 109-10 (2014).
146See Alaska Stat. x 15.13.072; see also Rev. Code Wash. x
42.17.093 (establishing separate reporting requirements for
‘‘out-of-state political committees’’).
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contribution limits, two former Alaska governors
raised fundamental questions about outside influ-
ence. One explained that ‘‘whenever a candidate
has to seek donations from outside the state, the can-
didate is buying a potential conflict of interest.’’147
The other asked, ‘‘How can the average Alaska
voter believe that a candidate who has accepted
thousands of dollars from non-Alaska resident con-
tributors who have pecuniary interests at stake in the
votes the candidate will cast if he or she is elected is
not obligated to the contributors as much as he or
she is to the voters?’’148 Applying strict scrutiny,
the Alaska Supreme Court upheld the nonresident
limits:
Alaska has a long history of both support
from and exploitation by nonresident interests.
Its beauty and resources have long been light-
ning rods for social, developmental, and envi-
ronmental interests. More than 100 years of
experience, stemming from days when Alaska
was only a district and later a territory without
an elected governor or voting representation
in Congress, have inculcated deep suspicions
of the motives and wisdom of those who,
from outside its borders, wish to remold
Alaska and its internal policies for dealing
with social or resource issues. Outside influ-
ence plays a legitimate part in Alaska politics,
but it is not one that Alaskans embrace without
reservation.149
The court relied in part on the anti-distortion ratio-
nale rejected as a compelling interest sufficient to
prohibit expenditures in Citizens United.150 Yet
the court also recognized that ‘‘[t]he state’s power
to preserve the political community by excluding
nonresidents from voting’’ might be extended ‘‘to
limit the influence of nonresidents over state elec-
tions through regulation of their campaign contribu-
tions.’’151 Even if the antidistortion interest is
insufficiently compelling to support expenditure
prohibitions, the interest in preserving the political
community may be sufficiently important to support
contribution limits.
In Landell v. Sorrell,152 however, the Second
Circuit rejected the Alaska Supreme Court’s analy-
sis on grounds that align with the Citizens United
Court’s deregulatory approach to campaign finance.
Invalidating a similar nonresident contribution
limit, the court distinguished the sufficiently impor-
tant interest of limiting candidate dependence on
large contributors from what it held to be an insuf-
ficient interest in limiting ‘‘the influence of one set
of people—untrustworthy outsiders.’’153 As it char-
acterized the interest, ‘‘[e]ven assuming that the
Alaska Supreme Court is correct that outsiders
have bad motives and little to contribute to its polit-
ical discourse, the government does not have a per-
missible interest in disproportionately curtailing the
voices of some, while giving others free rein,
because it questions the value of what they have
to say.’’154 Perhaps, as Bruce Cain argues, ‘‘there
is no reason to think that disallowing out-of-district
contributions is a sensible reform for every democ-
racy,’’155 and there is value to virtual representation
through campaign finance and other means. Yet a
strict constitutional rule against limiting (not pro-
hibiting) outside influence, under the speaker-neu-
tral freedom of speech according to Landell and
Citizens United, prematurely takes off the table
the question of whether it may be a sensible reform
for each democracy in the states that may adopt it.
In some states, calibrating contribution limits to reg-
ulate but not exclude outside influence in campaign
contributions may be substantially related to an
important state interest in preserving the basic con-
ception of a political community.
2. Disclosure. Disclosure is a less intrusive
means of distinguishing and regulating outsider par-
ticipation in the political process. Due to voters’ sus-
picion of outside influence—reflected in the
carpetbagger epithet—disclosure might be nearly
147State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P. 2d 597, 615
(Alaska 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1153 (2000) (testimony
of Former Governor Walter Hickel).
148Id. (testimony of Former Governor Jay Hammond).
149Id. at 617.
150Compare id. (‘‘These restraints [on nonresident campaign
spending] therefore limit ‘the potential for distortion’) with
Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 913 (‘‘we have found [the antidis-
tortion interest] unconvincing and insufficient’’).
151Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 616 n. 123. See also
Vannatta v. Kiesling, 151 F.3d 1215, 1222–25 (9th Cir. 1998)
(Brunetti, J., dissenting) (arguing that a ban on out-of-district
campaign contributions meets ‘‘a sufficiently important interest
in protecting [Oregon’s] republican form of government,’’ while
nonresidents are free to make independent expenditures).
152Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2004), rev’d on other
grounds, 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
153Id. at 148.
154Id.
155Bruce E. Cain,Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance
Reform, 1995 U. Chi. Legal F. 111, 133.
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as effective as direct limits by empowering voters
themselves to assess the importance of outside
influence. In Protectmarriage.com v. Bowen,156 a
challenge by contributors to the successful Califor-
nia ballot issue Proposition 8, the district court rec-
ognized this suspicion as meaningful. The court
rejected those contributors’ analogy to the Socialist
Workers’ Party157 for purposes of an as-applied
exemption to campaign finance disclosure. After
an extensive analysis of the role of disclosure in bal-
lot issue campaigns, the district court noted ‘‘[o]f
particular relevance in this case is the number of
out-of-state individuals and corporations contribut-
ing to the passage of a California referendum,’’
and held ‘‘[s]urely California voters are entitled to
information as to whether it is even citizens of
their own republic who are supporting or opposing
a California ballot measure.’’158
Where there are bright lines between outsiders
and constituents drawn by residency, outside influ-
ence should be easy to disclose through a contribu-
tor’s zip codes or other geographic information. In
the more complicated case of political committees
and parties that raise both inside and outside
money, residency information can be aggregated
by number of contributors or the amount of contri-
butions. Justin Levitt models disclosure of outside
influence on a ‘‘Nutrition Facts label for democracy,’’
what he calls a ‘‘Democracy Facts’’ disclaimer.159 It
emphasizes ‘‘simple proxies for the quantity and
fervor of local support for a particular communica-
tion,’’ including the number of contributors within
the district and the percentage of large contributors,
to ‘‘help flag the existence of a false bandwag-
on.’’160 Levitt’s goal is modest: ‘‘help to mitigate
informational miscues provoked by particular
frequently repeated communications.’’161 But he
shows how a focus on outside influence, rather
than any influence, might make disclosure more
effective with less of a burden on individual
participants.
One disconnect between the ends of disclosure
recognized in Protectmarriage.com and the law’s
means is that California required disclosure of the
name, address, and employer of every contributor
of more than $100 to the campaign committee,
which regardless of its constitutionality is ineffec-
tive as a policy matter. As Richard Briffault argues,
disclosure of names and addresses of small donors
means little to the public and media, but can
drown out more useful information about large
donors.162 Disclosure of the magnitude of outside
influence itself (either many small outside contribu-
tors or few large outside contributors) through Lev-
itt’s ‘‘Democracy Facts’’ or other cues, is a form of
what Bruce Cain calls ‘‘semi-disclosure.’’163 Such
disclosure might resolve debates over the value of
identifying at least small donors in campaigns.
Cain imagines the value for a voter ‘‘in knowing
that candidate Jones gets most of his money from
oil companies, doctors, or the [Service Employees
International Union].’’164 We might also consider
the value in knowing how much support or opposi-
tion a campaign receives from outsiders to be a suf-
ficiently important interest to distinguish outsiders
in campaign finance disclosure.
3. Public funding. The inside-outside distinc-
tion is less litigated in the area of public campaign
funding, though it is central to several leading mod-
els. One model is the Arizona and Maine Clean
Elections Acts offering voluntary public financing
for candidates (validated in Buckley v. Valeo),165
supplemented by matching funds in response to
opposing expenditures (invalidated in Arizona
Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett).166 In both states
the original public funding trigger requires a speci-
fied number of five-dollar ‘‘qualifying contribu-
tions’’ from insiders, voters registered in the
candidate’s district.167 Outsiders are irrelevant to a
candidate’s public support for triggering purposes,
and the public funding comes from the state.
156830 F. Supp. 2d 914 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
157See Brown v. Socialist Workers, ‘74 Campaign Committee,
459 U.S. 87 (1982) (holding campaign finance disclosure
unconstitutional as applied when ‘‘a minor political party that
can show a reasonable probability that the compelled disclo-
sures will subject those identified to threats, harassment, or
reprisals.’’) (quotations omitted).
158Protectmarriage.com, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 941, quoting id.,
599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1207–11 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
159Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29
Yale L. & Policy Rev. 217, 227–28 (2010).
160Id. at 227–228.
161Id. at 229 n. 52.
162See Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9
Election L. J. 273 (2010).
163Bruce Cain, Lead Essay, Shade from the Glare: The Case for
Semi-Disclosure, CATO UNBOUND (Nov. 8, 2010, 11:08
AM), < http://www.cato-unbound.org/2010/11/08/bruce-cain/
shade-from-the-glare-the-case-for-semi- disclosure/ > .
164Id.
165424 U.S. 1, 86 (1976).
166131 S.Ct. 2806 (2011).
167Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. x 16-946(B)(1); Maine Rev. Stat. 21A x
1122(7).
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Another model, New York City’s matching
funds program, similarly triggers public funding
for threshold contributions by residents of the dis-
trict,168 but also matches only city resident contribu-
tions (six-for-one for the first $175).169 Beyond the
entitlement to matching funds itself, insiders benefit
from the program through increased engagement by
candidates with a more representative set of constit-
uents.170 Other than the opposition-matching funds
at issue in Arizona Free Enterprise Club, the rela-
tive lack of constitutional questions raised about
these public funding programs suggests residency-
based triggers and matching funds may be a benign
form of limiting or diluting outside influence.
4. Shareholder protection. Another increasingly
important policy after Citizens United involves cor-
porate board or shareholder approval of campaign
expenditures, and more rigorous disclosure of cor-
porate conduits (like 501(c)(4) and 501(c)(6) organi-
zations). Corporate political participation by national
or multinational firms serves as a proxy for out-
side influence, since large corporations, at least,
are unlikely to have purely ‘‘inside’’ shareholders.
These policies also implicate the inside-outside dis-
tinction through their attempt to regulate the internal
affairs of foreign (out-of-state) corporations.
In Citizens United the Court rejected the share-
holder protection interest for a corporate campaign
expenditure prohibition, claiming there is ‘‘little
evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by share-
holders ‘through the procedures of corporate democ-
racy.’’’171 Typically, those procedures are governed
as internal affairs by the state of incorporation.172
While the Supreme Court has hinted that some
state corporate regulations with significant extrater-
ritorial effects may raise constitutional issues,173
the primary issues in state regulation of campaign
activity by foreign corporations are practical.174
Enforcing campaign finance laws against corpora-
tions, some of which may have no other connec-
tion to a state beyond a money trail that somehow
leads to a state campaign, may require treating
outsider corporations differently than corpora-
tions domiciled within the state. Here, the insider-
outsider distinction may help clarify the stakes for
such laws.
5. Federal campaigns. Finally, only federal
preemption prevents states from considering similar
inside-outside distinctions for campaign finance
policy governing federal candidates.175 As William
Marshall argues, devolution of campaign finance
policy to the states ‘‘will lessen the severity of the
risks of federal regulation and will provide opportu-
nities for different ideas and approaches to cam-
paign reform to percolate and emerge.’’176 One
way, perhaps, of bypassing if not resolving the
polarization and paralysis of campaign finance pol-
icy at the federal level is to allow the diversity of
state campaign finance regimes to be reflected
through the elections of federal officials. Each
state’s approach to outside influence differs within
the broad range of possible republican forms of gov-
ernment. Some states, like Alaska and Montana,
may have legitimate reasons for a provincial
approach to campaign finance given their history
of exploitation by outsider economic and political
forces, while other states may take a more cosmo-
politan or deregulatory approach.177 Indeed, before
federal preemption states did set their own cam-
paign finance regulations for federal campaigns.178
Within the current constitutional regime, no one
but foreign nationals may be barred from making
168N.Y.C. Admin Code x 3-703(2).
169N.Y.C. Admin. Code x 3-702(3).
170See Michael J. Malbin, Peter W. Brusoe, and Brendan Gla-
vin, Small Donors, Big Democracy: New York City’s Matching
Funds as a Model for the Nation and States, 11 Election L. J. 3,
13 (2012).
171130 U.S. at 911, quoting First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 US 765, 794 (1978).
172Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (‘‘Cor-
porations are creatures of state law, and investors commit
their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that,
except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibil-
ities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will
govern the internal affairs of the corporation.’’), quoting Cort
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campaign expenditures in any election, so the ques-
tion of outside influence in state elections for fed-
eral officials is clearly a matter of regulation
rather than exclusion. If ‘‘the basic conception of
a political community’’ reflected in federal elections
belongs to the state rather than the federal sover-
eign, that regulation might differ across different
states, reflecting each state’s distinct conception of
campaign finance. As long as the regulation remains
within broad constitutional boundaries, such as rea-
sonable contribution limits, disclosure, and public
funding, each state’s regulation should be recog-
nized to meet an important state interest in limiting,
disclosing, and diluting, but not excluding, outside
influence in campaign finance.
D. Lobbying
Do outsiders matter in lobbying? As Heather
Gerken puts it, ‘‘legislators will take the prefab
option’’ of a bill, talking points, and research all
rolled into one package.179 Like McDonald’s pro-
ducing hamburgers, lobbyists enjoy economies of
scale in producing bills for multiple states, and
also may enjoy economies of scope in producing
legislation in their clients’ interests across a variety
of policy areas. Given the ongoing nationalization
of state politics and policy, state legislators might
prefer mass-produced legislative packages from
national outsiders, even when it may not perfectly
fit their local political and policy needs, over less-
developed packages produced by local insiders
like small statehouse lobbying shops and budget-
constrained legislative services offices.180 One of
the characteristics that makes those outsiders more
efficient producers of legislation and political
strategy, however, is that they can ‘‘cut out the mid-
dleman,’’ the lawyer walking the halls of the state-
house for a diverse mix of clients, and establish
more direct and potentially corrupting connections
between the national clients and the legislators.
State lobbying regulation of outside influence may
be of particular concern because, while lobbying at
the national level threatens inefficiency through
rent-seeking,181 state lobbying on behalf of outsiders
also threatens wealth transfers from inside to outside
the state.What makes these direct connections poten-
tially corrupting is that the national client lacks the
relationship the local lobbyist might have with legis-
lators, and in its place the client might offer cam-
paign or other political support. ‘‘It is the way in
which individuals, organizations, and interest groups
can use campaign finance and lobbying together to
advance their private goals at potential cost to the
public interest, and not the campaign finance activi-
ties of lobbyists per se, that ought to be the primary
focus of regulatory efforts.’’182 Whiskey and steaks
are nice, but a connection with an interest group will-
ing and able to make a well-timed independent
expenditure is hard to beat.
Given this incentive structure, an outside group
might lobby most effectively by not ‘‘lobbying’’ at
all. It might convene state legislators from across the
country around policy interests shared by its clients,
and facilitate the development of ‘‘prefab options’’
by legislators and clients largely at its clients’ expense.
It might develop a network of state legislators to
which it communicates its clients’ legislative priorities
during sessions. It might develop political strategy
around legislation, and talking points and other
research to support or oppose particular bills. And
by directing its clients’ legislative strategy out of a
national membership organization that includes both
clients and legislators, it might avoid lobbying dis-
closure and regulation entirely. It might, in other
words, look like national political organizations
such as the American Legislative Exchange Council,
or ALEC.183 This model of outside influence is, as
ALEC claims, a ‘‘formula for success’’: nearly a thou-
sand bills based at least in part on ALECModel Legis-
lation are introduced in the states, and an average of
20 percent become law.184
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Outside influence in lobbying poses the same
question as outside influence in other areas of
political participation. The question is not
whether to exclude the outside influence from
political participation of any sort, but whether to
distinguish it for purposes of general regulation
of political participation. Federal law does this
at the national level, as it does for campaign
finance: foreign lobbying interests are subject to
more disclosure than domestic lobbying inter-
ests.185 State lobbying law might do the same,
requiring more detailed disclosure of out-of-state
lobbying principals to more effectively inform
the legislators lobbied, competing interest groups,
and the general public of outside influence.186 In
some states, an effort to address outside influence
in lobbying might start with repealing exemptions
for certain groups, including ALEC, from state
lobbying disclosure laws.187
Yet at least one state supreme court rejected an
attempt to distinguish outsiders, by invalidating a
law exempting the state’s citizens from the lobbyist
reporting law even when they only were lobbying
on their own behalf. With little analysis it held,
‘‘just as the privileges and immunities clause pro-
tects persons who enter other states to earn a living,
it must protect persons who enter this state to assert
or protect their interests before public officials.’’188
This odd analogy to a vague doctrine would benefit
from reading past the Privileges and Immunities
Clause all the way to the end of Article IV, where
in politics there is at least the countervailing prin-
ciple of ‘‘a Republican Form of Government.’’189
The interaction of these provisions should begin,
rather than end, a discussion of the constitutional
interests at issue in the state regulation of outside
influence.
CONCLUSION
Outside influence matters to state and national
politics. Bluman only begins to grapple with the
question of outside influence, and the federal regu-
lation of foreign nationals that is its subject conceals
the deeper constitutional roots of republicanism at
issue. That republicanism includes state, as well as
national, forms of government. As Citizens United
and subsequent constitutional developments open
state politics to more outside influence, states and
their citizens will explore old and new laws to reg-
ulate it in voting, petitioning, campaigning, lobby-
ing, and other forms of political participation. In
considering the constitutionality of these regula-
tions at the state and local level, courts should not
read the speaker-based holding of Citizens United
to the exclusion of its dicta on outside influence.
Instead, taking Bluman as a guidepost, courts should
cautiously avoid scrutinizing inside-outside distinc-
tions as suspect. The sovereign’s obligation to pre-
serve the basic conception of a political
community is a sufficiently important constitutional
interest to sustain state limitations on, but not exclu-
sions of, outside influence. As the Guarantee Clause
suggests, the health of the Union depends on some
degree of protection for state politics in order to sus-
tain national politics. Given the state of national
politics, we might not nationalize state politics.
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